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THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF INSIDER
TRADING: OUTSIDE THE LINES OF SECTION 10(b)
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Exchange Act") declares, "It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe... ." Insofar as this statutory provision for
imposing insider trading liability is conspicuously simple in form, it has
nonetheless been analogized to a "legislative inkblot,"2 one whose
language possesses "no intrinsic meaning but which must be plumbed for
deeper consequence."3  Rule 10b-5,4 the "centerpiece of federal
securities regulation,"5 promulgated under section 10(b) and the Security
and Exchange Commission's ("S.E.C.") administrative authority granted
thereby, is no less enigmatic.' Hence, with heightened S.E.C. enforce-
ment of insider trading violations,7 judicial scrutiny of the proper scope
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
2. Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It is an Inkblot We are Expounding:
Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 41 (1995).
3. Id.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). The language of Rule 10b-5, which mirrors that of
section 10(b), reads, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
5. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1990).
6. See id. at 448 (describing Rule 10b-5 and its terms as "notoriously vague"); Phillips
& Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65
(1984).
7. From 1990 through 1995, the S.E.C. pursued an average of approximately forty-two
insider trading cases annually, which, according to S.E.C. Enforcement Director William
McLucas, was "substantially higher" in number than ten years earlier. Susan Jenkins, Lawyers
Debate Future of Misappropriation Theory After Bryan, 27 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1331, 1332
(1995); see also William R. McLucas and Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading: Is It Back or Did
It Ever Really Go Away?, 9 INSIGHTS 2 n.4 (1995) (noting the number of SEC prosecutions
for insider trading violations during the years 1984 through 1994 were, to wit: 1984, 13; 1985,
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accorded § 10(b) and, in turn, Rule 10b-5, has stirred emotions among
even the most fastidious of legal observers.
The "misappropriation theory" of insider trading lies at the heart of
the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 interpretational debate. Adored by
market protectionists and criticized by "laissez-faire" advocates, the
misappropriation theory has evolved into the S.E.C.'s preeminent
prosecutorial weapon for combating fraudulent trading practices. In
effect, the theory prohibits "an informational advantage [from being]
obtained, not by superior experience, foresight or industry, but by some
unlawful means;"8 that is, "st[ealing] to put it bluntly."9  More specifi-
cally, it renders one's nondisclosure of material ° nonpublic" informa-
tion a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if such information was
obtained through a breach of any fiduciary duty and subsequently
employed in conjunction with a securities transaction." Recently
rejected in the Fourth 3 and Eighth14 Circuits of the United States
20; 1986, 34; 1987, 42; 1988, 27; 1989 40; 1990, 48; 1991, 42; 1992, 41; 1993, 34; and 1994, 45).
8. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 245.
10. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated the
"materiality standard," as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... Put another
way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available.
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
11. "Nonpublic" information constitutes any information to which all market participants
do not have equal access. Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
Such information must be specific and more private than general rumor. United States v.
Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942-43 (2d
Cir. 1979)).
12. See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Chest-
man, 947 F.2d 551, 556, 570 (2d Cir. 1991). In United States v. Willis, the court explained the
rationale underlying the misappropriation theory, as follows:
The underlying rationale of the misappropriation theory is that a person who receives
secret business information from another because of an established relationship of
trust and confidence between them has a duty to keep that information confidential.
By breaching that duty and appropriating the confidential information for his own
advantage, the fiduciary is defrauding the confider who was entitled to rely on the
fiduciary's tacit representations of confidentiality.
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
13. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
759 (1997).
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Courts of Appeals, and embraced within their Second, 5 Seventh, 6 and
Ninth 7 sister-circuits, the Supreme Court has yet to conclusively address
whether the misappropriation theory belies section 10(b)'s strictures.'"
In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court decree, perhaps no
more significant nor contentious an issue arises in securities law
jurisprudence than the misappropriation theory's validity as a vehicle by
which to impose section 10(b) liability. Its supporters vehemently assert
that the broad theory is wholly consistent with section 10(b)'s scant
legislative history. Indeed, congressional intent suggests that "effective
regulation must include several clear statutory provisions reinforced by
penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and deceptive
practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function"'9
and which are "detrimental to the interests of investors."'2  On the
contrary, critics find no authority for such an expansion of securities
fraud liability. They denounce the misappropriation theory's liberal
application of fiduciary concepts and subscribe to the Supreme Court's
restrictive textual interpretation of section 10(b).
Although the misappropriation theory has enjoyed nearly one decade
of federal court approval, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, in United
States v. Bryan2' and United States v. O'Hagan,22 respectively, have
recently rejected its legitimacy, thereby severely limiting the scope of
section 10(b) liability in those jurisdictions. The S.E.C., despite Bryan
and O'Hagan, strongly maintains the matter to be well-settled, and insists
it will persist in invoking the theory among other circuits.2  Others
warn against overstating the importance of Bryan's and O'Hagan's
15. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d
729 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
16. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
17. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (explaining that "[tjhe Court
is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the [misappropriation theory] and for
that reason affirms the [the defendant's conviction]."); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
235-36 (1980) (declining to address the misappropriation theory because "[tjhe jury was not
instructed on the nature or elements" of the theory); Bateman, Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985) (acknowledging in a footnote that the Court has "also
noted that a tippee may be liable [under Rule 10b-5] if he otherwise misappropriate[s] or
illegally obtain[s] the information.").
19. S. REP. No. 792, at 6 (1934).
20. Id. at 18.
21. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
22. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759, 136 L.Ed.2d 695 (1997).
23. See David E. Rovella, SEC Asserts Insider Trade Rule Still OK, NAT'L L. J., Sept.
4, 1995, at B1, col. 1.
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holdings, arguing that the vast majority of S.E.C. insider trading
enforcement actions will nevertheless remain unaffected.z4 Are Bryan
and O'Hagan, as some suggest, merely "aberrational" cases,' or do
they portend a shift in judicial philosophy, one that the Supreme Court
already holds evident, but upon which it has heretofore remained silent?
Seventeen years ago, Justice Stevens wrote of the misappropriation
theory and its validity, "I think the Court wisely leaves the resolution of
this issue for another day."26 Ironically, the Supreme Court has since
declined numerous opportunities to seize that day. 7 While Bryan
represented the first time the Court could have addressed a circuit split
as to the theory's legitimacy, no petition for certiorari was filed.
Fortunately, the Government has appealed, and the High Court has
chosen to consider, the Eighth Circuit's decision in O'Hagan. Thus, with
the misappropriation issue ripe for judicial review2 and a factually
clear-cut case29 before the Court, the day of which Justice Stevens
spoke shall soon arrive. Meanwhile, speculation resounds-will nine
justices, or a majority thereof, ultimately bestow compassion upon the
theory, or shall it be adjudged a doctrine whose day has come and gone?
This Comment shall objectively address, and attempt to answer, that
very question. In doing so, Part II briefly explores the history of the
misappropriation theory and insider trading generally. Part III then
examines the Supreme Court's textualist philosophy towards statutory
interpretation and its treatment of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in other
securities contexts. Next, Part IV renders a prediction as to the theory's
future based on section 10(b)'s plain language, followed by Part V's
analysis of the implications and policy justifications underlying such a
24. See Jenkins, supra note 7, at 1331.
25. Rovella, supra note 23, at B1, col. 1 (quoting Washington D.C., sole practitioner and
former S.E.C. enforcement chief John M. Fedders regarding Bryan).
26. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993):
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992);
United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 864 (1989); SEC
v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
28. The reasons the Supreme Court will consider in granting a writ of certiorari include,
"When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another United States court of appeals on the same matter." Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). As ex-
plained above, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits currently recognize the misappropri-
ation theory's validity, whereas the Fourth and Eight Circuits do not.
29. The term "clear-cut" is used to suggest that the Supreme Court could only find
§ 10(b) liability in the O'Hagan case based upon the misappropriation theory, and no other
"insider trading" doctrine.
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conclusion. Finally, Part VI summons Congress to legislatively curtail
the confusion surrounding section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by codifying a
definition of "insider trading."
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING REGU-
LATION AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. The Legislative and Judicial Origins of Insider Trading Regulation
From the moment President Roosevelt emphasized the need for
federal securities legislation that would prevent a recurrence of "the
terrible conditions of the years following [the] 1929 [stock market
crash],"3 the regulation of insider trading has developed as "a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."',
Initially, the 1934 Exchange Act, which included numerous anti-fraud
provisions that neither defined nor prohibited insider trading, sought to
address illicit market practices via continuous reporting obligations and
private section 16 actions. 32  However, with the inability of those
mechanisms to reach a growing range of trading abuses, section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 were beckoned to fill the regulatory void.33
Although not specifically forbidding insider trading, section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 have been judicially and administratively interpreted to
encompass such activity. 4  Early litigation generally implicated the
activities of traditional insiders (directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders), with liability premised on "strict common law duties of
loyalty and trust" owed to corporations and their constituent owners. 35
30. S. REP. No. 792, at 2 (1934).
31. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
32. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIEs REGULATION 823 (1991). Securities Exchange
Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1993), reads in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner [of at least ten per centum of a corporation's
equity securities], director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profits realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less than six months.... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ....
Id. Hence, section 16 does not actually define "insider trading." Rather, it establishes a very
limited bright-line rule as to how directors, officers, and shareholders possessing greater than
ten percent of a corporation's equity securities must conduct themselves.
33. COX ET AL., supra note 32, at 823.
34. Karen A. Fischer, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory, The Wrong Answer to
the Chiarella Question, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 701, 703 (1987).
35. John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need to
Codify the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. J. 895, 991 & n.28 (1988).
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Trading upon material nonpublic information without disclosure to one's
fiduciary constituted a breach of the good faith relationship existing
between those parties, as well as fraud or deceit within the meaning of
Rule 10b-5.36 Clearly, however, insiders remained free to capitalize
upon their informational advantages in open market exchanges.37 The
securities laws have since evolved to reach impersonal transactions and,
in doing so, abandoned those common law fiduciary principles in favor
of broader policy-based considerations.
B. The Modern Era of Insider Trading Regulation: In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., Dirks v. S.E.C., and Chiarella v. United States
The S.E.C.'s 1961 decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co." forged the
way for the "modern" era of insider trading regulation.39 In that
seminal case, the agency articulated the "disclose or abstain" rule: the
duty of traditional insiders to "disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position ... prior to effectuating a purchase
or sale"4 or, as an alternative, "to forego the transaction."'" Such
disclosure ensures, for want of a better expression, a "level trading floor"
between all market participants to whom the rule applies. Moreover, the
S.E.C. recognized that persons other than corporate directors, officers,
or controlling shareholders who obtained "tips" from traditional insiders
assumed the same duty to "disclose or abstain."4  The result was
unequivocal: section 10(b)-Rule 10b-5 liability reached even open market
36. Id. Although the meaning of the term "fiduciary duty" has escaped succinct
definition, one might best describe it as an actual expectation of fair dealing due to the
existence of a pre-existing trusting and confidential relationship. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a fiduciary relationship as one "subsisting between
two persons in regard to a business.., of such a character that each must repose trust and
confidence in the other and must exercise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith.").
37. See Cox ET AL., supra note 32, at 827 (citing D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION 37-49 (1990)). See also Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D.
Del. 1943), affd., 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (holding that "[t]rading [on the New York Stock
Exchange] is free and open" and that there is "no reason why one trader should be required
to furnish information to another trader.").
38. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39. LEWIS D. SOLOMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 939 (3d ed. 1994).
40. 40 S.E.C. at 911.
41. Id.
42. In Cady, Roberts & Co., the defendant was a stockbroker unaffiliated with the
corporation, but the information on which he acted came from a director of the corporation.
Id. at 912. The court stated that because the director could not have traded upon the
information without disclosure, it was only logical to extend this same prohibition to persons
who acquired the information from the director. Id.
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violations.43
The Supreme Court, in Dirks v. S.E.C.,4 judicially affirmed the
Cady, Roberts derivative duty concept. In effect, so-called "tippee
liability" is imposed "when the [traditional] insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach."'45 Dirks also delineated the circumstances in which outsiders
(e.g., underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consultants) themselves
owed fiduciary duties to corporate shareholders because of their
"temporary" insider status.46
While Cady, Roberts, and Dirks indisputably expanded the scope of
insider trading liability, the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United
States,47 exhibited judicial conservatism when it rejected the Second
Circuit's sweeping contention that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material non-public information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose."'  The defendant, Chiarella, was a "mark-up" man for
43. "We cannot accept.., that an insider's responsibility is limited to existing
stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made to non-
stockholders. This approach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public-wholly
unprotected from the misuse of special information." Id. at 913.
44. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
45. Id. at 660. To fall subject to § 10(b) liability, the tipper must also receive some type
of personal benefit for the information he or she passes. In Dirks, the Court explained that
such benefits may take the form of a "reputational benefit," a "pecuniary gain," or "a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend." Id. at 663-664.
46. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court's rationale in Dirks for recognizing a duty among
"temporary" insiders introduced a "special confidential relationship" concept to § 10(b)
jurisprudence:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis
for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
the information solely for corporate purposes... For such a duty to be imposed,
however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic
information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
Id. at 655 n.14. Thus, insider trading liability could reach outside the corporate fiduciary
relationship to penalize even those persons who would otherwise owe no duty to the
shareholders of the entity in whose securities they trade.
47. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
48. Id. at 231. The lower court's rule as to whom owed a duty to "disclose or abstain"
was only slightly narrower than that one which was articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (stating that "anyone
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public,
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Pandick Press, a financial printer, and deduced names of target
companies from documents he handled announcing corporate takeover
bids.49 Without disclosing that knowledge, he purchased stock in those
target companies and, once the attempted acquisitions were publicized,
promptly sold his shares.5" In overturning Chiarella's conviction, the
Court declined to stretch the notions of duty and fraud beyond their
traditional boundaries. The Court began by stating that "[nondisclosure]
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." 51  The
existence of this duty is essential to making silence fraudulent within the
meaning of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court then explained,
and very significantly so, that such a duty follows from "prior dealings"
between buyers and sellers, and as such, it refused to recognize "a
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." 2 Thus, Chiarella
established that, as a pre-requisite to violating the Cady, Roberts
"disclose or abstain" rule, there must exist a fiduciary link between the
alleged insider and those individuals with whom he or she trades.
The legal framework which Chiarella and Dirks established has
become synonymous with what is now termed the "classical" theory of
insider trading.53 In short, under the classical theory, any permanent or
temporary employee who trades upon material nonpublic information in
the securities of his or her employer-company violates section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Liability also arises if such a permanent or temporary
employee passes "inside" information on to a third-party who, in turn,
trades upon that information and confers a benefit to the tipper. As is
readily apparent, the classical theory's fundamental premise is that an
"insider owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information for his personal benefit."54
or ... must abstain from trading) (emphasis added)). Therefore, Texas Gulf Sulphur would
have imposed a general duty on all possessors of inside information to "disclose or abstain,"
an interpretation that Chiarella implicitly rejected.
49. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. As a "markup man," Chiarella's responsibilities entailed
selecting type fonts and page layouts for documents before they were type-set. United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
50. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
51. Id. at 230.
52. Id. at 233.
53. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
54. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
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C. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading. Chiarella and
Beyond
Chiarella not only proved instructive in its dissertation on duty and
its relationship to fraud within the meaning of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, but Justice Stevens's concurrence introduced the misappropriation
theory as a potential vehicle by which to impose insider trading liability:
The Court correctly does not address ... whether the petitioner's
breach of his duty of silence-a duty he unquestionably owed to
his employer and to his employer's customers--could give rise to
criminal liability under Rule 10b-5 .... [I]f we assume that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring companies that had
entrusted confidential information to his employers, a legitimate
argument could be made that his actions constituted "a fraud or
deceit" upon those companies 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.'"5
In contrast to the "classical" framework established by Chiarella and
Dirks,56 the theory does not mandate a fiduciary link with marketplace
traders. Rather, simply because misappropriated information is
employed in a transaction, the trade is deemed to be fraud "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of [a] security."57 In other words, the
breach of any duty owed to a misappropriatee is effectively transposed
unto the market at large-no duty to "abstain or disclose" need be owed
the individual to whom the misappropriator sells securities, or from
whom he purchases them. Although a majority of the Chiarella Court
declined to consider the misappropriation theory's merits, the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Newman," soon thereafter endorsed its
55. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 328. (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, in his
dissenting opinion, articulated a broader variation of the misappropriation theory, one to
which the SEC and federal courts have not adhered. He stated: "I would read § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or
to refrain from trading." Id. at 240 (Burger, Ci., dissenting).
56. As noted above, the Chiarella-Dirks "classical" framework may best be described as
a traditional, nontraditional, or constructive insider's duty to "disclose or abstain" from trading
on material nonpublic information obtained via a breach of fiduciary or similar trusting
relationship. The insider may only be subject to liability for conducting transactions with
persons to whom he or she owes such a duty (e.g., those individuals with whom he or she
possesses a fiduciary or similar trusting relationship).
57. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting the common
language of section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1987)).
58. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1984).
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validity. The Supreme Court has twice indecisively addressed the theory
in Bateman, Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc. v. Berner59 and Carpenter v.
United States.6°
Carpenter, a case which presented the Supreme Court with a story
more apt to have originated in a Hollywood script than on Wall Street's
trading floor, provides a wonderful illustration of the misappropriation
theory's breadth in practice. Petitioner Winans was a co-author of the
Wall Street Journal's investment advice column, "Heard on the Street,"
which, because it was widely read and respected, impacted the market
prices of stocks it discussed.6' Although he was familiar with the
Journal's rule that the contents of "Heard" were to remain confidential
prior to publication, Winans nonetheless furnished details concerning the
timing and substance of upcoming columns to petitioners Felis and
Brant, two stockbrokers, both of whom thereafter traded on the advance
information.6' In exchange for his "tips," Winans received a share of
the brokers' profits.63 A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the
defendants' convictions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, holding that
Winans had committed fraud on the Journal by misappropriating its
"confidential schedule of forthcoming publications"' and exploiting that
information "in connection" with trading activity.65 On review, the
Supreme Court disposed of the misappropriation issue without address-
ing its merits, stating: "The Court is evenly divided with respect to the
convictions under the securities laws and for that reason affirms the
judgement below on those counts. '
While it is uncertain whether Carpenter left the misappropriation
theory "alive and well"6 7 or "a fairly dubious proposition,"'  there
59. 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983))
(stating that the Justices "also have noted that a tippee may be liable [under Rule 10b-5] if
he otherwise 'misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information"'). However, because the
significance of this dictum is unclear and the misappropriation theory was not directly at issue,
this Comment will not discuss the case at length. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 836 (3d ed. 1995).
60. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. The net profits from the brokers' trades amounted to $690,000 over that four-
month period during which Winans provided the prepublication information. Id.
64. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 479 U.S.
1016 (1986).
65. Id. at 1032.
66. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
67. Sherry R. Sontag, Misappropriation Theory in Limbo: An SEC Victory - or Not?,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 10, col. 2 (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest, SEC Commissioner).
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exists little doubt that the doctrine holds tremendous promise to reach
a wide variety of trading abuses.69 Simply stated, the theory goes
outside the Chiarella-Dirks "classical" framework to reach trades in a
company's securities by individuals who are neither permanent nor
temporary employees of that company (e.g., individuals who owe no duty
to the company in whose securities he or she trades), as well as tippees
of those parties. It not only imposes liability where conduct smacks of
illegality, but fills regulatory gaps in which the "classical" abstain or
disclose rule provides no remedy." Indeed, "[w]ithout the aid of the
misappropriation theory, section 10(b) and [R]ule 10b-5 would lose much
of their efficacy as weapons against trading on nonpublic information
.... ,"I Notwithstanding its functionality, however, the theory's validity
has been called into question. Insofar as section 10(b) prohibits one's
use of deception to induce another's action or inaction in open market
exchanges, the misappropriation theory criminalizes breaches of fiduciary
duty and other confidential relationships, irrespective of their tenuous
connection to the disputed securities transaction. Thus, the issue is one
of interpretational debate: does the theory, as originally espoused in
Chiarella,72 truly capture "deception," or has it extended the term's
meaning beyond the plain language of section 10(b). Supreme Court
scrutiny of that provision in other contexts, as well as the Court's judicial
philosophy towards statutory construction, clearly suggests the latter.
III. SUPREME COURT SCRUTINY OF SECTION 10(B)
AND ITS CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY TOWARDS
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Few statutes better epitomize legislative imprecision than sec-
tion 10(b). It embodies language subject to multiple interpretations,
provides little basis for guiding statutory construction, and invites
meaning where none seemingly exists. Whether calculated or by
68. Donovan, Supreme Court Upholds Convictions of Former Business Writer Winans,
INVESTOR'S DAILY, Nov. 17,1987, at 1, col. 4 (quoting Alan Bromberg, Professor of Securities
Law at Southern Methodist University).
69. SOLOMAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 978.
70. Id. In SEC v. Cherif, the Seventh Circuit explained that the misappropriation theory,
"extends the reach of Rule 10b.5 to outsiders who would not ordinarily be deemed fiduciaries
of the corporate entities in whose stock they trade." SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
71. Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath,
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 380 (1988).
72. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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administrative neglect, Rule 10b-5 exhibits similar characteristics.
Indicative of the fact that, since 1986, incidences of 5-4 decisions in
Supreme Court cases interpreting federal securities laws have been
threefold the overall docket average,73 neither Congress nor the S.E.C.
has drafted succinct rules of conduct. In light of such ambiguity, the
misappropriation theory may very well be more a product of judicial
confusion than activism.
A. What Congress Said, Not What it Meant: Supreme
Court Textualism in the 10(b) Context
Principles of statutory interpretation define boundaries among
legislative expanse. Innumerable canons of construction have been
contrived for doing so,74 many of which, although bearing different
labels, yield like results. In contrast, the Supreme Court's treatment of
section 10(b) incorporates a markedly distinct textual, or "plain
meaning," interpretational methodology. Just as Justice Holmes once
professed to be solely concerned with "what Congress said, and not what
it meant,"75 the Court has largely limited itself to a literal reading of
section 10(b). Such a straightforward approach largely ignores historical,
moral, and policy considerations to effectuate legislative intent.76
Rather, it probes a statute's text and structure for meaning.7 7 Because
the Court's textual interpretation of section 10(b) holds undeniable
implications for insider trading regulation via the misappropriation
theory, its understanding warrants further colloquy.
"For almost two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned
against reading"7 the 1934 Exchange Act "more broadly than its
language and.., statutory scheme reasonably permit."79 The following
73. Grundfest, supra note 2, at 50.
74. There are essentially three main statutory interpretational theories which emphasize
either: "(1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute ('intentional-
ism'), (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute ('modified intentionalism'); or (3) the
literal commands of the statutory text ('textualism')." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990).
75. Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1037,
1058 (1995) (citing Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 419 (1899)).
76. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995).
77. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173-77
(1994).
78. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945 (4th Cir. 1995).
79. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
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discussion, in retracing the history of section 10(b) jurisprudence as set
forth in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,"°
reveals that challenges to conduct left unaddressed by the text of section
10(b) have been, at best, futile."' To illustrate, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,s the Court considered whether section 10(b) mandated
scienter as a prerequisite to liability, thereby relegating negligent
behavior outside the antifraud provision's reach. Despite evidence of
contrary congressional intent, the Court declined to "add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly
accepted meaning" 3 and, therefore, concluded that section 10(b) could
not "be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone."'
Only one term later, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green85 affirmed the
Ernst & Ernst interpretational axiom. The case was one in which Kirby
Lumber Corporation's minority shareholders protested a freeze-out
merger initiated by Kirby's parent, Santa Fe, alleging that Santa Fe
fraudulently appraised Kirby stock in an effort to squeeze out the
minority at an undervalued price.86 While the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged legislative history and policy concerns in concluding that a
majority's breach of fiduciary duty, absent any misrepresentation or
failure to disclose, did not contravene section 10(b), 7 it emphasized the
statute's "language ... [as] giv[ing] no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception."'  As
will be seen, Sante Fe Industries' substantive holding takes on added
significance in evaluating the misappropriation theory's validity.
Perhaps the starkest display of textualism is manifested in Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank 9 itself, a recent Supreme Court case
addressing aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
80. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
81. See id. at 173 (explaining that the Supreme Court has "refused to allow lob-5
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.").
82. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
83. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 174
(quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
84. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201.
85. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
86. Id. at 465-68.
87. See id. at 477-79 (explaining that the Court's recognition of an implied cause of
action for respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary duty would not fulfill congressional intent
and would pose a danger to vexatious litigation).
88. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174 (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)).
89. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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5. Following the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority's default on bonds over which Central Bank served as
indenture trustee, purchasers of the securities brought suit against
numerous parties, including Central Bank as an "aider and abettor,"'
for violating section 10(b).9 Prior to Central Bank, secondary liability
was by no means a novel nor overlooked concept among federal
courts.92 However, Santa Fe Industries and Ernst & Ernst had engen-
dered doubt as to its continued existence.93
The Court's methodical analysis in Central Bank proved true to
precedent. Aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 was an issue
to be resolved on textual bases, not policy considerations.94 "With
respect... [to] the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b), the text
of the statute control[led the] decision."'95 Because "the text of the
1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a section 10(b)
violation" and "[i]t is inconsistent with settled methodology in sec-
tion 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct
prohibited by the statutory text," the Court overturned Central Bank's
90. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit articulated the elements of a section
10(b) "aiding and abetting action" as: "(1) the existence of a primary violation of the securities
laws by another; (2) knowledge of the primary violation by the alleged aider-and-abettor, and
(3) substantial assistance by the alleged aider-and-abettor in achieving the primary violation."
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
91. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 166-67. "In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado
Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (Authority) issued a total of $26 million in
bonds to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills." Id. Central Bank served as indenture
trustee for the bond issues, which were secured by landowner liens and included covenants
requiring: (1) that the land subject to the liens maintain a "worth at least 160% of the bonds'
outstanding principal and interest;" and (2) that AmWest Development, developer of Stetson
Hills, "give Central Bank an annual report containing evidence that the 160% test was met."
Id. "In January 1988, AmWest provided Central Bank [with] an updated appraisal of the land
proposed to secure the 1988 bonds"; the appraisal showed that the land values were un-
changed from the 1986 appraisal. Id. After Central Bank's in-house appraiser determined
that the values listed in the appraisal appeared optimistic, he suggested obtaining independent
review. Id. at 168. "Before the independent review was complete, however, the Authority
defaulted on the 1988 bonds" and Central Bank was alleged "secondarily liable under § 10(b)
for its conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud." Id.
92. For federal court decisions imposing aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b),
see Clearly v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774,777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall River Industries,
Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974)); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970).
93. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 169-70, for examples of courts and
commentators calling aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) into question.
94. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 172-78.
95. Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 20 (quoting Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 172).
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conviction.%
At first blush, Central Bank's blatant disregard for legislative intent
appears indefensible. Even the vaguest of doctrines, our Constitution,
routinely implores judicial interpretation in light of historical and social
context. Section 10(b), however, is distinguishable on three grounds.
First, the statute is bereft of any explicit original intent.' The Senate
Report specifically addressing section 10(b) merely conveyed a purpose
of "prohibit[ing] or regulat[ing] the use of any other manipulative or
deceptive practices which [the S.E.C.] finds detrimental to the interests
of the investor.""s  Second, section 10(b)'s critical insider trading
terminology (e.g., "deception"), unlike the language of the Constitution,
is not open to whimsical judicial interpretations. For example, whereas
the Supreme Court has from time to time either expanded or restricted
the malleable definition of "interstate commerce" in the face of social
and political change, "deception" is a linguistic constant." And third,
Congress never sought to develop a civil remedy for section 10(b)
violations." It is, therefore, imprudent to criticize Central Bank's
textual holding without recognizing that the private right of action is as
empty as the origins from which it arose.'
B. Textual Interpretations of Other Securities Provisions
Strict adherence to statutory language is largely consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of other securities provisions.0 2 For
example, in Pinter v. Dahl, 3 the Court construed section 12(1)'s
definition of "seller" by "look[ing] first at [the provision's] language"'
96. Id. (quoting Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177-78).
97. Grundfest, supra note 2, at 44 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201
(1976)).
98. S. Rep. No. 792, at 18 (1934).
99. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
100. Grundfest, supra note 2, at 44 & n.22 (noting that Section 10(b) "does not by its
terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress,
or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy." Ernst & Ernst,
425 U.S. at 196.)
101. Grundfest, supra 2, at 45.
102. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175
(1994).
103. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
104. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
641 (1988)). Section 12(1) of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1), provides,
in relevant part:
Any person who... offers or sells a security in violation of section [5] ... shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue.., to recover
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and, reminiscent of Central Bank, explained that "[tlhe ascertainment of
congressional intent with respect to the scope of liability created by a
particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on the
language of that section."' 5
But intentionalism is not altogether extinct. An exception to textual
interpretation apparently exists where legislative history clearly fills gaps
within a statute's four comers. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., ° a case
wherein the Supreme Court considered whether recisionary rights under
section 12(2) extended to secondary transactions, exemplifies this
departure from "plain meaning" analysis. There, purchasers of Alloyd
Co. stock sought the recision of a private sale agreement with previous
shareholders on the premise that the contract constituted a section 12(2)
"prospectus" which contained material factual misrepresentations.'0 7
While Gustafson's dissenting opinion voiced allegiance to textualism, the
Court majority, resting its decision predominantly on congressional
intent, concluded:
The House Report ... states with clarity and with specific
reference to section 12 that section 12 liability is imposed only as
to a document soliciting the public .... In light of the care that
Congress took to justify the imposition of liability without proof
of either fraud or reliance on "those whose moral responsibility
to the public is particularly heavy"-the "originators of securi-
ties"-we can not conclude that Congress would have extended
that liability to every private or secondary sale without a whisper
of explanation." 8
Gustafson should not, however, be read as an absolute shift in interpreta-
tional philosophy, for distinct traces of "plain meaning" analysis echo
the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security.
Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, referred to above in section 12(1), generally
speaking, makes it unlawful to sell or deliver an unregistered security in interstate commerce.
105. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. at 1447 (quoting Pinter, 486 U.S. at 653)).
106. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
107. Id. at 1064. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act, provides, in relevant
part, that one who:
offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus ... which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ... to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount
of any income received thereon ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
108. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1072-73 (emphasis added).
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throughout the entire decision. For example, well before even consider-
ing legislative history, the Court explained that the term "prospectus"
was to be determined "by a reexamination of section 12 itself"'° and
resort to the texts of sections 2(10) and 10 of the 1934 Act."0 More-
over, Gustafson's justification for probing congressional intent-the
existence of a clear legislative record-is inapplicable to construing sec-
tion 10(b). Unlike section 12, section 10(b) is a regulatory tool without
assembly instructions. When a manufacturer fails to furnish directions
for the assembly of its product, one must examine the parts given him
and, through trial and logic, interchange them until an end-product is
fashioned. Likewise, the Court has been careful to work only with those
section 10(b) parts Congress has provided, and for want of legislative
guidance, assembled every one of them based upon their outward
appearance and textual interrelationships.
C. A Standard for Guiding Future Section 10(b) Interpretations
A comprehensive framework for guiding statutory construction may
be distilled from the foregoing discussion. Simply stated, absent a well-
articulated legislative record specifically addressing the provision and
question at issue, which is clearly not the case with respect to insider
trading under section 10(b), textualism directs judicial interpretation of
the securities laws.' Although remnants of the activist Warren era
(e.g., implied rights of action) shall continue to influence Supreme Court
decisions, "plain meaning" analysis will undoubtedly shape contemporary
securities jurisprudence, much as it has done for twenty years. Suggest-
ing otherwise would be to reject stare decisis, the most fundamental of
judicial principles under our common law system.
Textualism holds tremendous value for predicting future Supreme
Court interpretations of the 1934 Act. Conduct of which the statute's
language does not speak is unactionable, that is, what you see is what
you get. The misappropriation theory's future thus lies within sec-
tion 10(b)'s four corners.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IN LIGHT OF
SUPREME COURT TEXTUALISM
To foretell the misappropriation theory's fate is a linguistical exercise.
109. Id. at 1067.
110. See id. at 1066-68.
111. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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Every word within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 possesses a definition
to which the Supreme Court strictly adheres. A synthesis of those
meanings yields the limits of prohibited conduct. But where is that
boundary, and more importantly, does the misappropriation theory lie
within or without it? The following discussion, in answering these
questions and drawing upon United States v. Bryan and United States v.
O'Hagan, anticipates an analysis similar to one the Court might
undertake.
A. The Textual Parameters of Section 10(b) Liability
Recognizing that "[tihe starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself,t"" it is necessary to
reiterate the pertinent texts of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The former
reads, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... [t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.P3
The latter provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce ... [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."4
Initially, then, manipulation and deception lie at the heart of sec-
tion 10(b) liability. 5 However, because "manipulation" is a "term of
art [with]in the securities context," principally directed towards practices
frustrating market efficiency,"6 its interpretation is irrelevant to
assessing the misappropriation theory's validity. Rather, "deception"
alone carries the burden of regulating insider trading. To the extent that
112. Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
115. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing SantaFe Indust., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473, 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1302 (1977)).
116. Id. (citing Sante Fe Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. at 476 (explaining that manipulation
references activities "such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices," that are "intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.") (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976))).
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the S.E.C.'s exercise of administrative authority may not exceed its
statutory grant, logic dictates that a claim of "fraud" under Rule 10b-5
is actionable only if it can be viewed as "deceptive" within sec-
tion 10(b)'s meaning"17
While "deceit" and "fraud" are veritable synonyms outside the realm
of insider trading regulation, they receive dissimilar treatment within it.
The interpretation accorded "deception" is refreshingly straightforward
and uncontroversial. In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,"8 the
Supreme Court defined that term as one's material misrepresentation or
nondisclosure of information, to induce another's action or inaction, in
violation of a duty to disclose. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank has
since affirmed this construction."' On the other hand, "fraud" impli-
cates mere breaches of duty and fiduciary relationships. Recall that
Chiarella v. United States premised actionable fraud upon one's silence
in contravention of his or her obligation to disclose.' However, a
general duty to speak does not exist among all market participants-it
is only bestowed upon those persons with whom buyers and sellers of
securities possess a trusting and confidential relationship. 2'
It is readily apparent that deceit and fraud do not occupy an all-
encompassing common ground, for the latter may exist where the former
does not. In other words, fraud is a broader concept than deceit. Of
course, deceptive conduct will always trigger section 10(b) liability. The
converse, however, is a non sequitur. A claim of fraud and fiduciary
breach, standing alone, is not sustainable."z Deception must also
117. As articulated in Ernst & Ernst, the language of Section 10(b) must control the
interpretation of Rule 10b-5, for:
Rule lOb-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission under
§ 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by
the statute .... [Tihe scope of Rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under § 10(b). (Citations omitted).
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-14.
118. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945 (1995) (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc, 430
U.S. at 471-76)).
119. "As in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again conclude
that the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or
commission of a manipulative act." Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (citing Sante Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473; Ernst & Ernst, 425
U.S. at 214).
120. See supra text accompanying note 51-52.
121. See supra text accompanying note 51-52.
122. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946 ("As in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by
§ 10(b), we again conclude that the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstate-
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underlie the transaction.
A cursory review of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reveals that both
provisions require prohibited conduct to be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." The Supreme Court's original
interpretation of this phrase, articulated in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 3 has spurred significant controversy.
Justice Douglas wrote, "[the claimant] suffered an injury as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale of securities . ". .."" Whether the
"touching" construction was intentional or, as many contend, merely a
consequence of literary style, courts have since generally construed "in
connection with" to suggest "some nexus but not necessarily a direct and
close relationship"'" between the fraud and purchase or sale. Al-
though the immediacy of that link remains unclear, it presumes, at a
minimum, one very fundamental concept: the defrauded party is either
a buyer, seller, or possesses a vested interest (e.g., a fiduciary or similar
trusting relationship with the insider) in the transaction."6 That is, the
Chiarella Court unequivocally stated that fraud and, in turn, "[nondisclo-
sure] liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac-
tion."'27 Such a duty follows from "prior dealings" between buyers and
sellers, and as such, there does not exist "a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information."'28 Logically, therefore, "fraud" and "deceit"
place limits on section 10(b)'s and Rule 10b-5's common "in connection
with" language-for liability to arise, a duty to abstain or disclose must
exist between parties to a transaction. Even Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., with its de minimus touch test, embraced this principle, albeit
ment (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act."); Santa Fe Indits., Inc., 430 U.S.
at 473-74 ("Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach ... states a cause of action under any
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as manipulative or
deceptive within the meaning of the statute"); Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174
("Section 10(b) does not "reach[] breaches of fiduciary duty.., without any charge of
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.") (Citation omitted).
123. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
124. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
125. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582, 593 (7th Cir. 1984).
126. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "[tlhe
Court has left no doubt that the principal concern of § 10(b) is the protection of purchasers
and sellers of securities.")
127. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
128. Id. at 233.
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impliedly, for the fraud victim in that case was a seller of securities. 29
Textual analysis of section 10(b) thus bears a two-pronged test for
imposing insider trading liability. First, the alleged conduct must entail
a material misrepresentation or omission in violation of one's duty to
disclose nonpublic information. Second, where fraud is averred, the
claimant must not only be a buyer, seller, or interested party to the
securities transaction, but also one who, subsequent to establishing a
direct relationship of trust and confidence with the respondent, sustains
injury arising from a breach thereof. This dual inquiry demarks the
outermost boundary of section 10(b)'s scope and, in doing so, provides
a standard against which the misappropriation theory's validity may be
measured.
B. The Misappropriation Theory: Caught Out of Bounds
Recall that, under the misappropriation theory, Rule 10b-5 is violated
whenever one (1) "steals" material nonpublic information (2) via a
breach of duty arising from a trusting or confidential relationship and (3)
thereafter transacts upon that information, (4) regardless of whether he
or she owed any duties to shareholders of the company in whose stock
he or she trades.3 As such, "fraud" is manifested in the act of
misappropriating information from another to whom a duty is owed.
However, the "theory does not require that the buyer or seller of
securities be defrauded.''. Rather, the section 10(b)-Rule 10b-5 "in
connection with" requirement is deemed satisfied merely because the
stolen information is later used in a securities transaction; the informa-
tion's source need not be affiliated with either the buyer or seller.3 2
The misappropriation theory clearly does not meet the two-part test
extracted from section 10(b)'s language. In contravention of the first
prong, the theory imposes liability for any breach of fiduciary duty or
similar trusting and confidential relationship, even where "deception" is
non-existent. The theory also fails the test's second inquiry, for it does
not require that the defrauded party be a buyer, seller, or one who
129. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 7, 10 (1971).
130. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 971 U.S. 1053 (1985)).
131. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992).
132. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995). Because the "source" of
the inside information is irrelevant for purposes of imposing § 10(b) liability under the
misappropriation theory, it has been referred to as a "fraud-on-the-source" theory. See
also Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
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possesses an interest in the disputed transaction.
Although the Supreme Court majority in Chiarella did not entertain
the misappropriation theory as a means by which to exact section 10(b)
liability, the facts of that case nicely illustrate the theory's infirmities in
practice. There, to reiterate, the defendant, Chiarella, misappropriated
takeover bid information from his employer, Pandick Press, a financial
printer, and with that knowledge traded in the securities of target
companies.'33 Chiarella owed, and admittedly breached, a duty to his
employer. But Pandick was not a purchaser or seller of those target
corporations' shares, nor did it possess an interest in Chiarella's
transactions. Because the investing public was not personally defrauded,
the misappropriation theory would have attempted to transpose
Chiarella's defrauding of Pandick onto the market at large. However,
the language of section 10(b) simply does not subscribe to such a tenuous
nexus between the trader and marketplace. t 4
Both Bryan and O'Hagan rejected the misappropriation theory on
grounds similar to those articulated above. In each case, however,
greater weight was accorded to the first prong of the aforementioned
two-part inquiry. That is, section 10(b)'s and Rule 10b-5's common "in
connection with" language was paid lip service, but somehow seemed
secondary to the courts' "deception" analyses.'35 This Comment
submits that, while Bryan and O'Hagan were correctly decided, the "in
connection with" requirement should have played a more significant
role--one that rested on equal footing with section 10(b)'s "deception"
constraint-in arriving at their respective conclusions. In other words,
the "in connection with" language, on the one hand, and deception, on
the other, are interrelated concepts that must be read together to gain
definition. One can not deceive another unless one owes a duty to
disclose to another. The "in connection with" requirement maintains the
integrity of this duty-purchaser/seller relationship. The misappropriation
theory, however, renders meaningless the "connection with" statutory
language, as it permits liability for breaches of duty owed to individuals
who are unconnected with and perhaps even uninterested in a securities
transaction.36 An obvious question thus arises: Why would Congress
133. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (1980).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
135. In Bryan, for example, the Fourth Circuit limited its substantive analysis of § 10(b)'s
"in connection with- requirement to a single footnoted paragraph. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950
n. 17.
136. U.S v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
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have inserted empty words into one of the Exchange Act's most
significant, yet brief, provisions? Quite simply, it did not. The "in
connection with" language should be understood for what it is, a
legislative insurance policy against reading deception out of sec-
tion 10(b). It is an integral part in the section 10(b) "package" and
should not be tossed aside merely because Congress failed to include
assembly instructions.
Whether this Comment accurately depicts the methodology which will
eventually settle the misappropriation issue is subject to debate, but
given the Supreme Court's penchant for "plain meaning" interpretation
and market deregulation, it is unlikely that the theory would endure
judicial scrutiny upon a grant of certiorari. The Court's strict adherence
to statutory language simply poses too insurmountable an obstacle for
individuals alleging new forms of liability under the 1934 Act. Assuming,
then, that textualism ultimately brings an end to the misappropriation
theory, how might the future regulation of insider trading be affected?
Moreover, are there any policy considerations justifying the theory's
demise? Part V, in addressing these issues, recognizes that even though
''plain meaning" analysis largely ignores concerns foreign to a statute's
text, no decision exists in a vacuum.
V. S.E.C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE 1934 ACT WITHOUT MISAPPRO-
PRIATION AND POLICIES JUSTIFYING THE THEORY'S DEMISE
A. Insider Trading Regulation in the Absence of Misappropriation
Insider trading regulation is only as effective as the tools with which
the S.E.C. has to work. For obvious reasons, therefore, that agency has
vehemently opposed all efforts to quash the misappropriation theory.
Similarly, market protectionist groups, including a large contingency of
plaintiffs' attorneys, maintain that the theory fills "a large gap" which
"cannot be minimized."' 37 Their concerns certainly are understandable,
but nonetheless unwarranted, for a Supreme Court rejection of the
misappropriation theory will ultimately have minimal impact on federal
efforts to combat insider trading. 38
Indeed, the necessity for misappropriation liability may be exaggerat-
ed. Chiarella and Dirks established an ambit of prohibited conduct
within which the vast majority of section 10(b) offenses hitherto
137. Jenkins, supra note 7, at 1331 (emphasis added).
138. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 (1995).
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prosecuted have fallen.'39 More often than not, defendants are either
traditional or constructive insiders and their tippees"'-individuals
who would owe a duty to disclose material nonpublic information or
abstain from trading even in the misappropriation theory's absence. In
fact, the Second and Fourth Circuits have gone so far as to concede that
past convictions premised on the theory might very well have been
successful under the Chiarella-Dirks "classical" framework.' 41 For
example, in United States v. Newman,42 Jacques Courtois, Jr., and
Adrian Antoniu, both employees of investment banking firms, misappro-
priated confidential information identifying the targets of proposed
acquisitions undertaken by their respective employers' corporate clients.
Courtois and Antoniu then surreptitiously conveyed this information to
Mitchell Newman, who passed it on to Franklin Carniol and Constantine
Spyropoulos 43 All three tippees traded in the stock of the target
companies and shared their profits with Courtois and Antoniu.'" In
two instances, the targets themselves were clients of Coutois' and
Antoniu's investment banking firms. 45  Although the Second Circuit
found that Newman had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under a
misappropriation theory of liability, the classical theory would have
sufficed. In other words, Courtois and Antoniu were "temporary
insiders" of, and owed duties to, the two targets which their employers'
firms represented. When they misappropriated information and passed
their duties on to Newman, Courtois and Antoniu via Dirks' tippee
principle, the subsequent trading activity constituted a clear "classical"
theory violation. Much as courts have abused section 10(b) in finding
meaning where none exists, the S.E.C. has unnecessarily exploited the
misappropriation theory.
While misappropriation-free securities laws would not always reach
those who trade on "stolen"' 6 information, the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes provide adequate means by which to criminalize such
139. Id. at 952.
140. McLucas and Angotti, supra note 7, at 12.
141. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (noting that "[a] temporary insider theory of prosecu-
tion might well have covered the activities of the investment banker in Newman and the
printer in Materia"): Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953 (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566).
142. 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at n.1.
146. In this context, "stolen" information comprises information which has been
misappropriated by an individual who owes no duty to the company in whose stock he or she
subsequently trades.
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activity.47  Actually, the Supreme Court's interpretation of sec-
tions 1341 and 1343, as espoused in United States v. Carpenter,48 may
extend liability even beyond the misappropriation theory's purported
scope. Whereas section 10(b) requires that the claimant be one who
personally suffers from another's direct fiduciary breach, the plain
language of the mail and wire fraud provisions mandate no such nexus
between a misappropriator and his or her trading victim. Rather,
sections 1341 and 1343 demand only that their respective mediums of
communication "be used to execute the scheme at issue."'149 This
construction would seem to suggest that any person who obtains material
147. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 952 (1995). The federal mail and wire fraud laws consist of
three separate statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346. Section 1346, which provides the
definition of "scheme of artifice to defraud" for application in sections 1341 and 1343, reads:
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme
or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
The federal mail fraud statute, Section 1341 reads, in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any... security... for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to
be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be
fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added).
The federal wire fraud statute, Section 1343, reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmit-
ted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C § 1343.
148. 484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987).
149. Id. at 28.
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nonpublic information via fraudulent means and thereafter trades upon
it by use of the mails or wires will be subject to federal prosecution.
And no one can reasonably deny that virtually every modem securities
transaction is conducted via the mails and/or wires. Interestingly, Chief
Justice Burger's version of the misappropriation theory, articulated in his
Chiarella dissenting opinion, 5' is essentially of the same coverage as
sections 1341 and 1343, but has fallen into disfavor among lower federal
courts for being too expansive) 5'
B. Policy Considerations Justifying the Misappropriation Theory's
Demise
Although textualism largely overlooks policy to extract meaning from
a statute's language, the Supreme Court accepts extra-textual consider-
ations insofar as they may show a result "so bizarre" that Congress must
have intended a different interpretation.'52 This caveat to "plain
meaning" analysis appears little more than a trivial judicial attempt at
appeasing advocates of original intent and is, therefore, unlikely to be
invoked in any decision rejecting the misappropriation theory. 53
Nonetheless, there are sound policy justifications underlying the theory's
demise.
The misappropriation theory, with its foundations grounded in
breaches of state-governed fiduciary relationships, simply does not
provide clear guidelines by which investors may order their affairs, a
problem whose obvious solution contradicts fundamental principles of
federalism.'54 As the Bryan court noted,' the theory has imposed
150. See supra note 55.
151. These courts have generally followed Justice Stevens's rendition of the misappropri-
ation theory, articulated in his Chiarella concurrence. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,
453 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the theory "applies only where the misappropriation occurs
by means of a violation of fiduciary or similar duty.").
152. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,188 (1994)
(citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)); cf. Pinter v. Dahi, 486 U.S. 622,
654 (1988) ("[W]e need not entertain Pinter's policy arguments"); Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (language sufficiently clear to be dispositive).
153. This Comment does not intend to diminish in importance the "so bizarre" exception
to textual interpretation. However, due to the Supreme Court's treatment of the caveat in
past cases, it is evident that the threshold for finding a result beyond congressional intent has
become virtually unattainable. For example, while the Central Bank Court proffered policy
arguments to justify, rather than override, its textualist conclusion, it disposed of the "so
bizarre" inquiry in a single sentence, stating simply: "That is not the case here." Central Bank
of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188.
154. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 951.
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liability arising from such diverse associations as between an employer
and current employee,'56 an employer and former employee,'57 a
newspaper and columnist,' a psychiatrist and patient, 59 a husband
and wife, 6' and a father and son. 6' Whether a fiduciary or similar
relationship of trust and confidence existed in each case depended on the
law of the state in which the breach occurred. As such, the misappropri-
ation theory, in effect, assumes fifty very different permutations, with
some permitting certain trading practices where others prohibit them,
and vice versa. 62 Hence, to the extent that "it is essential ... to have
a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited and
instructed by the S.E.C.'s inside-trading rules,"'63 a rejection of the
theory may also be predicated on non-textual bases. After all, the
nature of centralized securities markets invariably requires interaction
among individuals (i.e., security holders, brokers and traders) located in
numerous states. Making the disposition of a federal Rule 10b-5 charge
turn on a court's preliminary choice-of-law analysis is as daunting a
proposition as recognizing fifty different variations of the same federal
offense.
A federalized set of fiduciary relationships would undoubtedly
obviate the shortcomings of a misappropriation theory reliant on state
156. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
157. See id.
158. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
159. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
160. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992).
161. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
162. For example, some states require a "valid corporate purpose" for the elimination
of the minority interest through a short-form merger, whereas other states do not. Sante Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,479 n.16 (1977) (comparing Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (merger arranged by controlling
stockholder for no business purpose except to eliminate fifteen percent minority stockholder
violated Georgia short-form merger statute), with Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d
78 (Del. Ch. 1962) (Delaware short-form merger statute allows majority stockholder to
eliminate the minority interest without any corporate purpose and subject only to an appraisal
remedy)). Thus, whereas the misappropriation theory would impose section 10(b) liability in
Georgia for a majority shareholder's trades based on inside information that was obtained
through an elimination of minority interests without any valid corporate purpose, it would not
do so for the same act in Delaware (assuming the majority shareholder owed no duty to the
individual with whom he or she transacted).
163. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933,950 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
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law principles."6 However, the Supreme Court has previously held
that its recognition of such an approach would be both impracticable and
tantamount to an usurpation of state authority:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden .... Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders,
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.65
When balancing the need to retain the misappropriation theory with that
of protecting states' rights, both sound policy and common sense dictate
that the latter consideration deserves greater accord. Indeed, financial
markets will endure without the misappropriation theory, but the nation
fueling them will fail without federalism. This obviously is not to say
that all legal doctrines which promote federalism are necessarily
desirable or ones threatening it are inherently repugnant. Rather, it is
representative of the manner in which courts have over-exaggerated the
breadth of section 10(b) liability and created liability for conduct that the
1934 Exchange Act never anticipated.
In light of numerous textual and policy justifications for the
misappropriation theory's judicial rejection, one might reasonably
wonder why its invalidity is even questioned. The answer is sim-
ple-Congress has never so much as defined "insider trading." Thus,
virtually any interpretation may be read into section 10(b)'s vague
language under the guise of that term. Given recent congressional
concern for securities-related issues, it may very well be that the
misappropriation theory's fate is ultimately decided on Capitol Hill. 6 '
VI. A PLEA FOR CONGRESS TO DEFINITIONALLY CODIFY "INSIDER
TRADING"
Despite sixty years of judicial development, the law of insider trading
remains unclear. Its evolution is replete with ad hoc decision-making
and patchwork analysis. In all fairness, the Supreme Court has
responded admirably to a barrage of illicit practices that the 1934 Act
164. Id. at 951.
165. Sante Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 479 (citations omitted).
166. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at 875.
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never anticipated. However, as the incidences of insider trading continue
to escalate, 67 so too shall the confusion accompanying them. After all,
there is no indication that unscrupulous investors will soon refrain from
contriving innovative new methods of market exploitation. Hence, with
recognition of the federal courts' already overburdened dockets, it is
imperative that Congress intervene to define "insider trading."
Congress has twice flirted with codifying a comprehensive definition
of "insider trading."'" Both the Insider Trading Sanction Act of
1984169 and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988171 contemplated doing so, but neither altered the then existing
substantive law.'7' Congress was apparently satisfied with the judicial
development of insider trading regulation and feared that flexibility
would be lost if a bright-line rule were enacted. 7 1 True, as the House
Committee indicated, court-drawn parameters generally "have estab-
lished clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider trading
cases."' 7 3 However, the same cannot be said for non-traditional (e.g.,
misappropriation) claims under section 10(b), for the misappropriation
theory, in relying upon state fiduciary principles, effectively takes on fifty
different forms, with some permitting certain trading practices where
others prohibit them. Moreover, a legislative fix is not necessarily
inconsistent with the S.E.C.'s ability to flexibly regulate insider trading,
for Congress may, if it desires, define the term to cast upon a broad
array of conduct. The issue is not one of scope, but specificity. As the
law currently stands, investors simply are not provided with fair notice
of those practices for which they may be penalized. 74
167. See McLucas & Angotti, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
168. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at 875.
169. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13 (1983).
170. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988).
171. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59 at 873 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983)).
172. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355 at 13-14, 31-33 (1983).
173. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at 875 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 12
(1988)).
174. But the Supreme Court has decreed that the securities market "demands certainty
and predictability," United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994) (citation omit-
ted)). and that "it is essential ... to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities
must be limited and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950
(quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
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A. Formulating a Codified Definition of "Insider Trading"
Given the need for a legislative definition of insider trading, what
form might it take? An examination of existing regulations governing
foreign markets may provide the answer. For example, unlike the
United States, the European Community (EC) has codified specific
prohibitions to curtail insider trading.'75 Council Directive 89/592:
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing (Directive), adopted among
EC member nations in 1989, represents a departure from its American
counterpart's fraud rubric.'76 Rather than focusing on breaches of
fiduciary duty, as does section 10(b), the Directive succinctly defines
"inside information,"'" "insiders,"' 78 and "insider trading."'7 9  Al-
though the struggle to establish competent agency implementation of this
legislation has resulted in little discernable change, 8° the European
model is a lesson for our Congress. The EC Directive contemplates
abuses that even section 10(b) cannot address, yet does so without
sacrificing definitional clarity. Indeed, insider trading need not be a
"term of art" to effectuate comprehensive regulation.
Domestic ingenuity has also contributed to the cause of defining
175. Daniel J. Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the
Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L. LJ. 177, 184 (1995).
176. See Council Directive 89/592 on Regulations on Insider Trading, 1989 OJ. (L 334)
30 [hereinafter Council Directive 89/592]; Standen, supra note 175, at 185.
177. Under the Directive, "inside information" is that "information which has not been
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or
to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to have
significant effect on the price of the securities in question." Council Directive 89/592, supra
note 172, art. 1(2).
178. Article 2(1) of the Directive defines an "insider" as:
any person who: by virtue of his membership of the administrative,
management or supervisory bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in
the capital of the issuer, or because he has access to such information by
virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession, or duties, possesses
inside information...
Id. at 117-18.
179. The Directive contains separate provisions to define "insider trading" amongst
primary violators (i.e., "tippers") and secondary violators (i.e., "tippees"). Article 2(1)
prohibits a primary insider "from taking advantage of [inside] information with full knowledge
of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account of a third
party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that
information relates." Id. at 120. Article 4 effectively imposes "tippee" liability upon "any
person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge of the facts possess
insider information, the direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a person
referred to in article 2." Id. at 121.
180. See Standen, supra note 175, at 189.
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"insider trading." In 1985, the American Bar Association recommended
alternative, fraud-free approaches to criminalizing illicit trading
practices, 18' but they proved too controversial for congressional
approval. Two years later, the S.E.C. proposed its rendition of
legislation which would have prohibited one's
... buying or selling securities while in possession of material
nonpublic information that was "wrongfully" obtained or the use
of which would be wrongful .... [I]nformation is wrongfully
obtained or used if it is obtained by or as a result of, or if its use
would constitute, (i) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espio-
nage through electronic or other means, or (ii) a breach of duty
to maintain information in confidence, when that duty arises from
a relationship with specified sources ....182
The language plainly was but a mere reiteration of then existing fiduciary
and misappropriation theory principles. Thus, Congress purportedly had
no incentive to codify that which already existed at common law.
Clearly, however, its grounds for inaction were unjustified. The S.E.C.'s
1987 proposal was by no means conventional, for it sought to codify an
insider trading theory that the Supreme Court had never approved, the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits have since outrightly rejected, and legal
commentators have continually questioned.
Past refusal to overhaul the securities laws and enact a definition of
insider trading "does not necessarily indicate legislative unwillingness to
consider narrower approaches."' 83  That is, a solution may lie in
supplementing, rather than supplanting, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) where lines of prohibited conduct are blurred."8
However, this option presupposes congressional disposition towards a
broad definition of insider trading, one that would invariably entail
codifying the misappropriation theory. Anything less will require
sweeping reform, and will likely find its basis in the Chiarella-Dirks
"classical" framework. Irrespective of the shape definitional legislation
may take, be it "gap-filling" or revisionary, deceit and fraud should
remain as its crux. After all, contemporary insider trading law is broken,
181. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at 874-75 (citing ABA, Comm. On Fed. Reg.
Of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation under
the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 223 (1985)).
182. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at 874 (quoting SEC, Proposed Legislation:
Memorandum of the SEC in Support of the Insider Trading Act of 1987. 1987 FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) para. 84, 152 at 88, 853 (Aug. 7, 1987)).
183. See id. at 875.
184. Id.
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not irreparable, and its existing "classical" foundations effectively address
relationships from which market violations typically arise. Of course,
should Congress wish to codify the misappropriation theory, it need
make but one simple revision to section 10(b)-replace the word
"deceptive" with "fraudulent" in the statutory phrase, "[i]t shall be
unlawful... [t]o use... any manipulative or deceptive device."
B. Congressional Winds of Change Bring Promise for a Definitional
Codification of "Insider Trading"
Perhaps the change in Congress' political composition will coincide
with an increased awareness of securities law issues. Relatively recent
developments certainly would suggest so. On December 20, 1995, the
House overrode President Clinton's veto of a bill designed to curb
private actions under section 10(b). I"5 Although the piece of legislation
did not attempt to codify "insider trading," it sends an encouraging
message to those who have abandoned hope for congressional interven-
tion on the issue.
Any definition of "insider trading" enacted under the current
Republican-controlled House and Senate will undoubtedly differ from
one that might have been passed by their Democratic predecessors. Is6
In contrast to the 1984 and 1988 legislative efforts at expanding the
scope of insider trading law, the GOP's infamous "Contract with
America" conveys a general spirit of deregulation, not only in the
securities context, but amongst many different areas of federal concern.
Therefore, an expansion of the 1934 Act, and particularly section 10(b),
is improbable in the years to come. Meanwhile, one can only remain
optimistic about the prospect for a definitional codification of "insider
trading." Unfortunately, extraneous political influences187 and Wash-
ington bureaucracy shall continue to stymie future reform.
185. See David R. Sands, House Overrides Clinton Veto of Securities Fraud Suit Bill,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at A3; House Votes to Override Veto of Bill, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
21, 1995, § 3, at 3.
186. Jenkins, supra note 7, at 1331.
187. For example, the bill discussed supra text and accompanying note 185, presented
an "excruciating political dilemma for Mr. Clinton, dividing two of his key bases of political
and financial support." Sands, supra note 185, at A3. While one prominent plaintiffs' attorney
contributed $120,000 to the Democratic Party during the first six months of 1995, political
action committees for the securities industry and "Big Six" accounting firms gave more than
$150,000 in the same period to House reform supporters. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The day of which Justice Stevens spoke some seventeen years ago,
to arrive later this year when the Supreme Court renders its decision in
United States v. O'Hagan, shall mark a significant juncture in securities
law jurisprudence. Whether that momentous day brings an end or a new
beginning to the misappropriation theory is subject to speculation, but,
as this Comment suggests, its judicial demise is more probable than not.
Simply stated, the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with Dirks and
Chiarella, as well as in conflict with the Court's time-honored textualist
approach to interpreting section 10(b). The outcome would likely be no
different if Congress, in its current deregulatory state, were to intervene
and definitionally codify "insider trading." Irrespective of which
governmental branch addresses the misappropriation theory's validity, it
must be done with utmost sensitivity towards both investors' rights of
fair notice and the S.E.C.'s ability to effectively, as well as efficiently,
regulate securities markets.
Although highly-publicized insider trading scandals of the 1980's
piqued Americans' interest in Wall Street and its underworld, the
lackluster nature of more recent section 10(b) violations has largely
stemmed their curiosity. Contemporary cases just "aren't quite as
colorful... we don't have a briefcase being exchanged in the hallway at
midnight."'" If anything, the misappropriation theory's most endear-
ing quality may be its potential to revive the drama of that foregone era.
Without it, cases such as Carpenter would be reduced to the unglamorous
world of mail and wire fraud. True, insider trading can entail tremen-
dous intrigue and often raises societal outrage over dishonesty in the
marketplace. However, is the anger really warranted? That is, perhaps
the misappropriation issue is subsumed by a much larger question:
Should insider trading be prohibited in the first place, and if so, why?
While its answer requires more than a response of, "Yes, because the
practice is unfair," courts, commentators, and the S.E.C. alike have all
had difficulty identifying what harms actually arise from trades based on
material nonpublic information. To borrow from the words of Justice
Stevens, "I think [this Comment] wisely leaves the resolution of this issue
for another day." ' 9  In the meantime, by enacting section 10(b),
188. Jenkins, supra note 7 at 1331 (quoting SEC Enforcement Director William
McLucas).
189. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Congress has drawn the lines in the war against insider trading. It is
time that the courts and S.E.C. wage battle within them.
JOSEPH J. HUMKE
